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ADVANCING BINATIONAL COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER
MANAGEMENT ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
Stephen P. Mumme
Colorado State University

Introduction
In a region of few substantial rivers and a mean precipitation that varies between 21
inches and 5 inches annually it is hardly unusual that groundwater should be a staple in the water
budgets of cities and farms alike, or that it would be vital for maintaining the region’s ecological
resources. Where such the geo-hydrology of such a region is bisected by an international
boundary it is hardly unusual that conflicts should and do arise as these resources are
appropriated by different national communities. What is, perhaps, unusual is that in a time of
greater dependence on groundwater resources and greater understanding of its centrality in the
life and progress of this region’s resident society that it should remain poorly managed, even
neglected from the view of the affected dependencies. And this, unfortunately, describes the
situation on the U.S.-Mexican border.
The importance of groundwater to the border economy has long been understood and has
certainly grown as surface supplies have dwindled in the face of rapidly growing populations.
Throughout the border region it is easy to find communities that are wholly or nearly dependent
on groundwater for their water supply.1 Columbus, New Mexico depends wholly on
groundwater as does its Mexican sister city, Palomas, Chihuahua. Douglas, Arizona is whole
dependent on groundwater and so, too, is Bisbee, Naco, and Lukeville (Gringo Pass). Even
communities astride the border’s major river systems rely heavily on groundwater. El Paso,
for instance, has until recently sought 80 percent of its water supply from Hueco Bolson, a large
subsurface lake straddling the international border. Further down the Rio Bravo, Presidio and
Ojinaga depend mostly on groundwater, as does Del Rio, Texas. In the lower Colorado river
region, 80 percent of the communities and farms in the Mexicali Valley rely on groundwater.
Suffice to say that groundwater has assumed a role and importance that is critical to the survival
and improvement of the border region.2
As groundwater has taken on a larger role in the water economy of the region the basic
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truth is our institutions have not caught up. We are today operating in an institutional
environment heavily predicated on an older set of operating assumptions that remain out of sync
with modern conceptions of sustainable development and water management. The situation is
complicated by the international boundary and the abutment of two rather different socioeconomic and administrative approaches to national water management. At this international
level our current institutional arrangements remain heavily focused on the allocation and
management of surface water and relatively inflexible in addressing a growing range of water
management needs that include the management of shared aquifers the reach and breadth of the
border. This reality is reflected in a growing number of actual or potential binational conflicts
related to groundwater in the border area.3
While the prospect for settling these disputes in a cooperative manner remains clouded it
is certainly true that the heightened visibility of these issues coupled to the urgent need for
secure water supply has changed the situation somewhat over the past decade. To better
understand the chances for advancing binational cooperation in this area it is necessary to
consider the enduring impediments to binational cooperation as well as the emerging
opportunities for progress in this area. In the pages that follow this paper provides a brief
background on binational relations in this area and surveys the present status quo. It then
reviews the critical constraints and opportunities influencing binational cooperation on
transboundary groundwater problems. The paper concludes by identifying some situations and
approaches with promise of generating greater binational cooperation on transboundary aquifer
management in this decade.

Binational Cooperation on Transboundary Groundwater: Minute 242 and its Aftermath
The institutional marker for tracking binational progress in managing border groundwater
aquifers is certainly the International Boundary and Water Commission’s Minute 242, struck in
August 1983.4 Some discussion of this minute is necessary as it both responds to and sets a
frame of expectations for binational cooperation in groundwater management that is with us to
this day.
The origins of Minute 242, of course, lie in the U.S.-Mexican crisis over salinity of the
Colorado River, a crisis, or conflict that endured more than a decade from 1961 to eventual
settlement in 1973. Between 1965 and 1973, to compensate for the degraded Colorado River
treaty water received from the United States, Mexican farmers drilled nearly 600 wells for
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agricultural purposes in the Mexicali valley and San Luis Rio Colorado mesa.5 Mexican
pumping on the San Luis mesa alarmed U.S. farmers south of Yuma, Arizona who were
similarly dependent on groundwater–owing to the known aquifer gradient favoring Mexico. As
negotiators finalized a settlement on salinity in 1973 they thought it wise to incorporate a
moratorium on new groundwater development in the area and seize the opportunity to address a
well recognized lacunae in the landmark 1944 Water Treaty that apportions water between the
two countries in the Colorado and Rio Grande river basins.
Thus, in addition to its better known impact on the management of salinity in the
Colorado river, Minute 242 became and remains the only bilateral agreement directly addressing
the management of groundwater underlying the international boundary. The minute has a
number of interesting features that are set out in Resolutions 5 and 6:6
·

Resolution 5 requires that “each country shall limit pumping of groundwaters in
its territory within five miles (eight kilometers) of the Arizona-Sonora boundary
near San Luis to 160,000 acre-feet (197,358,000 cubic meters) annually.

·

Resolution 6 stipulates that “With the objective of avoiding future problems, the
United States and Mexico shall consult with each other prior to undertaking any
new development of either the surface or the groundwater resources, or
undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in its own
territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other country.”

·

Resolution 5 arguably implies a commitment on the part of the two countries to
seek to achieve “a comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border areas .
. .” The Resolution’s lead sentence begins with the conditional phrase, “Pending
the conclusion by the Governments of the United States and Mexico of a
comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border areas . . .”

In the matter of groundwater management Minute 242 remains a highly controversial
agreement. Aside from the fact that Minute 242 remains the only binational agreement
regulating groundwater pumping at a specific location within a specific aquifer in the border
area, it commits the two countries to consultation on new groundwater development in shared
aquifers borderwide and contains the tantalizing promise of a binational effort spearheaded by
the federal governments to attain a generalized bilateral agreement on the management of share
aquifers. A number of aspects of this agreement warrant some further comment.
First and perhaps foremost, the development of the Minute 242's commitment on
groundwater lacked the level of political support that was necessary to move forward in this
5
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policy area. There is ample reason to suppose the agreement was widely viewed by the U.S.
Colorado River basin states as an infringement on state authority to regulate groundwater within
their respective borders.7 Colorado’s governor expressed these sentiments at the time.8 The
agreement’s chief U.S. negotiator, Herbert Brownell, presented the represented the groundwater
amendment to Congress as essentially non-binding.9 Even Arizona authorities, who certainly
signed on to the pumping limit at San Luis, were known to have resisted negotiating with
Mexico on groundwater, lobbying successfully instead for a major well-field in Yuma County
just outside the agreed upon geographical limit.10 While there were certainly some pressures
from Mexico and from certain quarters of the agricultural and scholarly community in the U.S. to
consider addressing groundwater management on the border, in general we can say with
authority there was no great enthusiasm for this undertaking by most U.S. water stakeholders in
basin or the border area. If anything, it was irksome to many that a link to groundwater had been
drawn to the 1944 Treaty and that a precedent might have been set by regulating groundwater in
one specific region of the border.11
Second, it doubtful that the minute was intended to apply comprehensively to
groundwater quality even though its larger operational context and principal clauses are related
to Colorado River salinity. It is certainly true that the diplomatic record refers to the problem of
water quality only as related to salinity.12. Resolutions 5 and 6 center on the problem of
apportionment, though nothing in the minute restricts the governments from consulting on
development threatening the quality of groundwater stock or addressing the problem in a future
binational agreement.
Third, there are few terms of reference that apply to the implementation of the agreement.
The 1944 Water Treaty itself is distinctive for its lack of referent terms. Minute 242 as such
contains no terms of reference defining concepts in the text. The concept of “border areas,” for
7
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instance, is undefined. Are we to assume it means eight kilometers either side of the
international line? Or should we apply a more contemporary bureaucratic definition of the
border area as 100 kilometers either side of the border? Or might it be acceptable to define the
border on a watershed, or aquifer, basis? The simple truth is there is no binational operational
agreement on this term or any others. What, for instance, are we to make of the obligation to
“consult”? What does this entail?
In short, aside from a few particulars, in the area of groundwater, Minute 242 was
politically ahead of its time. Since the agreement was struck the two governments have paid
something more than lip service to groundwater aspects of the agreement, informing each other
of groundwater related development in the lower Colorado River region, on the Santa Cruz
River, and in the El Paso-Cd. Juarez area and other locations. A few cautious feelers have been
put forward since the mid-1990's on the question of exploring groundwater agreements in certain
areas but these efforts were not pursued.13 The one concrete accomplishment that might be
attributed to the authority of Minute 242–though no further formal action has entered the
IBWC’s official ledger to this effect–is recent support for aquifer analysis and data sharing that
has been driven, in part, by the institutional momentum and sustainable development imperative
of the Border XXI Program and its recent successor, Border 2012. I will have more to say of
this later in the paper.
In sum, if we narrowly examine what the governments have accomplished under Minute
242 in the last 30 years we see negligible progress towards sustainable management of
transboundary groundwater aquifers. What the federal governments have largely done for three
decades is steadfastly defend their sovereign right to exploit the resource through the operant
legal regimes that apply in the relevant administrative zones where the aquifers lie. This reality
has contributed to a race to the bottom in various localities along the border. The reasons for
this sorry state of affairs are various but rooted mainly in the decentralization of the water law
and administration in the U.S. and the concomitant political difficulty of regulating private
utilization of these supplies in the absence of a serious threat to urban water supply or at least the
perception of such. To better understand this predicament is helpful to look at the principal
constraints on binational management of transboundary groundwater.

Constraints on the Binational Management of Groundwater Resources
Binational cooperation on managing shared aquifers confronts a range of serious
constraints that continue to restrict federal initiative in this policy area. These limitations or
obstacles can be generally categorized as legal, political, diplomatic, economic, and hydrological
13
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in nature.
Legal constraints. Historically, the legal barrier to managing transboundary
groundwater has been quite high. In both Mexico and the U.S., groundwater may legally be
claimed as property and much of the groundwater found in our transboundary aquifers is owned
individuals rights holders. How rights are claimed and regulated, however, varies considerably
from country to country and, in the U.S., from state to state. Mexico still follows a centralized
regime in water management that allows the government to legally assert an interest in the
proprietary use of groundwater resources.14 While groundwater ownership is appurtenant to
ownership of overlying property and owners are otherwise free to use the water as they see fit
subject to an obligation not to injure other parties, the utilization of groundwater may be legally
regulated by the Mexican state. Under the authority of the Mexican constitution’s famous
Article 27 and Mexico’s National Water Law, inclusive of its most recent version enacted this
year, the federal government, acting through the National Water Commission, may designate
groundwater protection areas and regulate their use.15 Proprietors may challenge administrative
decisions but appear to be in a comparatively weak position to do so given the strong
presumption in favor of federal administration. Recent changes in Mexican national law actually
reinforce federal authority over groundwater ownership and extraction while otherwise
promoting a more decentralized approach to water management than in the past that gives states
greater voice in regional water policy.16
In the U.S., however, legal administration of groundwater is decentralized, situated at the
state level. All four U.S. border states, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, operate
under different groundwater management regimes, though an underlying constant in border
states’ legal practice has been to grant broad latitude to individual proprietors to exploit the
resource. A brief description for each state’s legal system follows below.
Texas’s legal regime remains the most permissive, essentially attaching groundwater,
unless otherwise specified, to the ownership of overlying property and allowing unfettered
extraction of groundwater unless an adjoining proprietor is able to establish damage arising from
such pumping. While state law authorizes the Texas Water Commission to regulate
groundwater, the agency has been loathe to do so in the face of adverse court decisions
questioning it regulatory authority.17 The exception here is those localities that have taken
advantage of recent state conservation legislation authorizing the establishment of voluntary
groundwater conservancy districts.18 The TWC has consequently functioned as more of a
14
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facilitator for local areas considering such initiatives. Because the districts are voluntary, in the
absence of further legislation defining groundwater rights and practices the system provides
considerable latitude for private challenge to conservancy district regulatory actions.19
New Mexico law establishes groundwater as public property to be utilized subject to the
doctrine of prior appropriation which requires substantiation of a pattern of beneficial use.
Groundwater permits are issued by the State Engineer conferring a legal right to groundwater
utilization that may be sold or otherwise transferred provided a beneficial use is maintained.20
New Mexico is also unique among the border states in that state courts have established a
hydrological connectivity between groundwater and surface water.21
Arizona has long used the doctrine of reasonable use that allows an overlying property
owner to use the water beneath the land so long as it is used beneficially and reasonably as
determined by the court when and if disputes should arise among co-adjacent owners.22 It also
follows a general statute, the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, adopted in 1980. This
law establishes four Active Management Areas intended to help conserve groundwater in each
area. Each area is required to establish a groundwater management plan.23 Groundwater
pumping in these areas is measured. Existing irrigation is protected but any new irrigation
development is prohibited and extant pumpers are encouraged to consider use modifications that
conserve groundwater.24
California, in contrast, does not have a general law regulating groundwater use and relies
mainly on correlative rights doctrine supplemented by various other doctrines for adjudicating
disputes on extraction.25 Under this practice the overlying landowner retains a proprietary right
to groundwater contingent on others’ rights to use the same aquifer. The principle of prior
appropriation is used if extracted water is not used on the overlying land and the principle of
mutual prescription may be employed in situations of overdraft.26 Like Texas, California permits
19
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local water districts to establish safe yield limits and regulate groundwater withdrawals. Such
districts have been used to regulate use and recharge groundwater pools.27
In sum, the decentralization of groundwater management at the state level is a serious
impediment to bilateral groundwater management initiative. Not only are the four border states
jealous of their state sovereignty and legal traditions affecting groundwater extraction and use,
the actual practices various substantially, complicating the development of any uniform approach
to groundwater regulation at the binational level. In the U.S., federal initiative, insofar as it
may be found, operates mainly through national statutes on sanitation and pollution, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Water Quality Act, Safe Drinking Water Act,
Clean Water Act, and National Environmental Protection Act, to name the most prominent of
these statutes. These laws are not insignificant pieces of the regulatory picture affecting
groundwater but thus far have been used with little effect in prodding states to consider
exploring the utility of binational cooperation in managing common groundwater resources.
Political-Diplomatic Constraints. The decentralization of groundwater law and
management within the U.S. federal system is further associated with substantial state political
influence in the crafting of federal law and administrative practice in national water policy.
Political scientists studying U.S. water politics have long noted this tendency. The crafting of
federal water policy remains arguably the most decentralized sphere of U.S. national policy
making. By one scholar’s count at least 70 different congressional committees and subcommittees now influence federal water policy development.28 Federal agencies heavily vested
in water policy, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, for instance, are often viewed as dependencies
of Congress, administrative agencies that are disproportionately dependent on congressional
oversight in matters of both budget and policy.29
This reality is certainly evident in the politics of the principal federal agency charged
with administering binational treaty commitments with Mexico pertaining to water and taking
the diplomatic lead in seeking solutions to binational water disputes. Established under
authority of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, the International Boundary and Water
Commission’s United States Section has historically functioned as a virtual congressional
agency.30 Technically, the agency is a part of the Department of State. Since 1945 it maintains
an IBWC Liaison Officer in the Office of Mexican Affairs, runs its budget through the
Department and looks to State formally for executive approval of its administrative acts. Its
27
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Commissioner under treaty enjoys the diplomatic rank of ambassador.31 From a strictly political
perspective, however, it is still heavily dependent on the support of the U.S. border and basin
states that comprise its operational constituency. The U.S. Section remains officially
autonomous of State for purposes of personnel and operational management. Its appropriations
run through a House Appropriations Committee sub-committee that historically defers to border
state interests in the agency’s authorizations. The simple reality is that with the four border
states commanding 96 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives no sitting U.S. president is
particular anxious to mount a challenge on border water issues. Politically it is only a slight
exaggeration to claim that where water is concerned, border state sovereignty is national
sovereignty at the White House.
The political-diplomatic reality is such that the IBWC-US Section should not be expected
to take the initiative in developing proposals for transboundary groundwater agreements in the
absence of clear support from the affected U.S. state or states. Each border state has, in effect,
an operational veto on the U.S. Section’s initiative with the singular exception that the U.S.
Commissioner has treaty authority to exchange information with his Mexican counterpart and,
since Minute 242, an obligation to report those U.S. developments that would likely affect
groundwater extraction in Mexico within the eight kilometer border strip
The situation is politically different in Mexico where the Mexican Commission, the
Comision Internacional de Limites y Aguas (CILA), operates under the thumb of the Mexican
Foreign Ministry. Since Mexico’s greater democratization in 2000, Mexican governors and
elected representatives have become more assertive in expressing an interest in water policies
affecting their states but water policy is still highly centralized and border water matters are
sufficiently nationally visible to require a substantial executive interest in their resolution. If the
Mexican Commissioner is able to convince Mexico’s the Foreign Ministry of the value of a
overture to the United States, and if the proposal passes muster at Mexico’s sub-cabinet on
water, loosely consisting of the Environmental Secretariat’s National Water Commission, the
Secretariat of Agriculture, the Mexican Treasury Secretariat, and presidential staff, then the
Mexican Commissioner may be authorized to proceed. In an interview in 2002, however, the
Mexican Commissioner noted that Mexico has only made one such proposal to the U.S. and this
was limited to a request to negotiate a particular groundwater dispute, that involving the AllAmerican Canal in the lower Colorado River region of California.32 Mexico’s caution here is
likely related to its perception of the high stakes involved in groundwater matters, the potential
politicization of these issues, a desire to maintain favorable relations with the U..S., and its
understanding of the limitations of the U.S. executive in this policy area.

31
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The political and diplomatic constraints, then, are set by the general decentralization of
water policy in the U.S. and the difficulty of generating the political support of the border states
that is most certainly prerequisite to any serious exploration of a transboundary groundwater
agreement. While Mexico is certainly in a better position to advance a federal interest in such an
agreement, its reserve in doing so seems conditioned on both an understanding of the political
difficulty of moving forward in the U.S., the liability to a Mexican president should any initiative
come to naught, and a broader interest in maintaining favorable relations with the U.S.
Economic Constraints. At least some of the constraints limiting binational cooperation
on managing transboundary groundwater aquifers are economic in nature. Most water
economists would argue that market forces are an important influence on institutional practices
in water management. Price is a critical element here. Where prices are low there is apt to be
little awareness of scarcity and limited interest in conservation of existing supply whether the
source be above or beneath the surface. An economist would argue that an awareness of
scarcity is the essential precondition for any earnest impulse toward the cooperative management
of a common pool resource like groundwater. Until recently, perhaps even now, these
economists would argue that the price of water in the border region has simply been too low to
drive a sense of urgency amongst water managers and the public at large, domestically or
binationally.
Information is another critical element. Not only is information necessary to gauge
prices, the difficulty of acquiring information contributes to the transaction cost that add to the
cost of purchasing water from different sources. So long as cheaper supplies may be had there
is little incentive to acquire further information or pay greater transaction costs.
If we look at these variables as they are manifest at the border we can begin to
understand why the two countries have had limited interest in greater cooperation on
groundwater. At the present time upwards of 80 percent of all border area water is consumed by
agricultural on both sides of the border.33 While agricultural water prices vary along the U.S.
reach of the international boundary it has been almost uniformly true that water has been cheap
with prices held low by federal and state subsidies. In California’s Imperial Valley, the largest
claimant and arguably the greatest single beneficiary of the complex domestic and international
agreements allocated Colorado River water, the average cost per acre-foot of field water
delivered is currently just below 15 dollars.34 In Arizona, where prices have been influenced by
the Central Arizona Project, CAP irrigation is more expensive, selling for nearly 80 dollars an
33
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acre-foot.35 Municipal-industrial water controlled by urban water districts normally requires
more treatment and fetches higher prices, yet until recently El Paso still paid the El Paso County
Water Improvement District as little as 15 dollars an acre-foot for Rio Grande river water.36
Proprietary groundwater is even less expensive. Proprietors essentially use water at the cost of
lift and conveyance. In South Texas, depending on the utility source, groundwater pumpers
effectively pay between six and nine dollars an acre-foot with no limit on their ability to pump
under Texas’ permissive law of capture. 37 The situation is similar in New Mexico where one
water economist claims that “owners of domestic wells treat water as a free good.”38
Such low prices for raw water tend to reduce demand for institutional mechanisms
requiring a higher level of social regulation in managing water resources. Insofar as needs can
be easily satisfied through ready access to abundant supply coupled with low transaction costs,
social demand for more complex management mechanisms is lessened.
Lack of adequate information is also impedes binational cooperation. It is still true that
little is known concerning the available supply, quality, and fluid dynamics of transboundary
aquifers. As a resource, the information costs associated with groundwater are high.
Groundwater analysis and modeling is not only expensive but the science remains inexact.39
Until the mid-nineties, neither the U.S. Geological Survey, the IBWC’s U.S. Section, or most
state agencies had seriously studied groundwater characteristics in the border area with the
possible exception of the El Paso region along the Rio Grande and the lower Colorado River
aquifer in the All American Canal zone. While various studies had been made by USGS and
U.S. state water authorities–New Mexico has been quite active, for instance–these studies were
not and in most case are still not considered reliable measures of water stock or flow at the
international border. Mexican studies were similarly sporadic, non-comprehensive, and
inconclusive. Both countries were reluctant to share their best data on joint aquifers and
unwilling to engage in joint research and data gathering.
From an economic point of view, then, a critical element is wanting for understanding the
value of transboundary groundwater or placing a price on the resource. Much of what was
claimed about transboundary groundwater over the last half century remained highly speculative.
35
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The Texas State Water Plan in the 1970's projected a 50 year supply of groundwater for the El
Paso region based on extraction rates, demand projections, and what was known of groundwater
availability in the important Hueco and Mesilla bolsons, but this was an educated guess given
what was then known of the aquifer.40 Even less was known of other locations.
Taken as a set, these various constraints, legal, political-diplomatic, and economic, still
pose a considerable deterrent to binational cooperation on transboundary groundwater
management. And yet they may not be insurmountable. Some recent developments in the
international arena and the border area are beginning to offset these longstanding constraints.
These developments suggest that the longstanding binational impasse on managing
transboundary aquifers may yet be resolved in a cooperative fashion.

Emerging Opportunities for Binational Cooperation
In little more than a decade a number of important developments in the border area have
begun to challenge the longstanding resistance to binational cooperation on transboundary
groundwater. These trends include the rapid urbanization of the border region and the
reallocation of water supplies, the threat posed by prolonged drought, the recent elevation of
water issues on the binational agenda, and the emergence of new institutions and practices for
managing water in the border area. While none of these developments in itself should be
considered decisive in producing a diplomatic breakthrough in this issue-area, we are witnessing
a shift in outlook that may well lead to new cooperative initiatives in managing transboundary
aquifers.
Urbanization and Changing Demand for Water. Urban development in the U.S.-Mexico
border region continues to outpace national trends in both countries and this fact is the most
critical social indicator influencing water demand. Between 1980 and 1995 the population of
U.S. border counties rose by 45 percent, the population of Mexico’s border adjacent municipios
rose by 60 percent.41 Conservative estimates predict a 39 percent increase in U.S. county
population between 2000 and 2020 and an 85 percent increase for Mexican municipios in the
same interval.42 Mexican border water consumption is expected to double in this interval, based
on demographic growth and per capita consumptive use trends.43
40
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These trends are hiking up urban water prices and driving transfers of agricultural water
to municipalities all along the border. El Paso County recently negotiated a deal with the city
that charges 193 dollars an acre foot for Rio Grande water.44 In San Diego, the county water
authority now delivers Colorado River water purchased from the Metropolitan Water District
water to consumers at 565 dollars per acre-foot.45 In South Texas, irrigators now actively market
water to local municipalities responding to the greater market value of urban water.46 As prices
rise so does incentive to cooperate in managing scarce water resources. It hardly comes as any
surprise that incipient demand for better binational cooperation on groundwater has emerged in
metropolitan zones along the border where water is scarce and prices have begun to rise
dramatically.
Water Quality. Environmental cooperation since NAFTA has given greater priority to
the problem of water quality in the border region, drawing attention to the critical link between
pollution and groundwater contamination. Beginning with the Integrated Border Environmental
Plan in 1992, the environmental ministries identified groundwater contamination as one of the
critical issues needing further study in the border region.47 The Border XXI Program that
followed sustained this emphasis. The new Border Environment Cooperation Commission
(BECC) further emphasized the protection of potable water supply in border communities,
financing projects that took pollution prevention into account. In 1993 the IBWC undertook a
landmark study of the water quality of the Rio Grande river that signaled a new level of
binational cooperation in monitoring water quality in concert with the national and state
environmental authorities.48 In response to environmental concerns, it has since gathered data on
groundwater quality in proceeding with development of a transboundary groundwater database.49 This heightened awareness of the importance of managing transboundary groundwater
44
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to safeguard urban water supply has broadened the scope of debate on groundwater management
at the border.
Severe, Prolonged Drought. Drought has afflicted the border region now for more than a
decade in most locations and is expected to persist in both the Colorado and Rio Grande River
basins. The spectre of drought in the two major river basins serving the border region has
already provoked institutional responses that accentuate public attention to the importance of
groundwater and groundwater management in the border area. In general, groundwater is seen
as a hedge against scarcity. Texas’ 2002 State Water Plan identifies drought a critical factor
defining the need for further conservation and wise water use and points to groundwater as the
key source of water augmentation in response to water scarcity.50 On the Rio Conchos, a major
tributary of the Rio Grande river, Mexican irrigation districts have stepped up drilling and
development of groundwater, reducing runoff to downstream communities in Mexico and the
U.S.51 Municipalities like El Paso are looking to develop major inter-basin transfers from
remote well-fields to augment their water supply.52 On the Colorado river where a host of
conservation measures are now being implemented in response to drought groundwater stock is
being both recovered and augmented. The lining of the All-American canal, for instance, is
intended to recover water now lost to Mexico while other aquifers in the basin are targeted for
recharge, infusion, and the banking of any surplus surface water as may come available.53
50
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This heightened emphasis on groundwater recovery as a response to drought has
has not directly affected binational water management discussions beyond the case of the AllAmerican canal but is certainly a factor on the minds of rural and municipal water managers
border-wide. Drought complicates the problem of demographic growth for water provision and
adds to the urgency of securing a reliable supply. It is now an important force behind a more
intensive search for alternative water sources from a menu of options that includes groundwater
extraction, storage, blending, reuse, desalinization, and importation or any combination of these.
It is in this sense that drought presents an opportunity for innovative thinking concerning
transboundary groundwater management.
The Institutional Context for Binational Water Management. Institutional change may
well be the most important contextual factor shaping the prospects for cooperation on
transboundary groundwater. In little more than a decade the institutional milieu has markedly
changed on the border. These changes include both new organizations and new approaches to
managing shared water resources. They have also nurtured new advocacy groups, greater public
participation, and growing support for further reform of water management practices on both
sides of the border. This changing context has several aspects. It is evident in the establishment
of new management institutions and advisory groups with water management mandates. It is
evident in the reshaping of established institutions like the IBWC. It is seen in the incorporation
of a broader range of participants and stakeholders in border water discussions and policy
development. And it is seen in the development of new models for binational cooperation at the
subnational level.
Binational Institutions, Old and New. At the binational level our institutional approach
to managing common water resources has been dominated since 1945 by the International
Boundary and Water Commission, supplemented after 1983 by a framework for discussion and
deliberation set out in the La Paz Agreement. The IBWC, operating under the authority of the
1944 U.S.-Mexican Water Treaty, was given responsibility for implementing and interpreting the
water and boundary treaties in force between the two countries with the consent of the
governments.54 Its brief had mainly to do with monitoring and enforcing the rules for allocating
the water of the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers and, secondarily, with designing solutions for
border sanitation problems. Its jurisdiction was highly circumscribed, limited to matters
affecting the boundary as such. It operated as a diplomatic agency, defensive, insular, secretive,
and responsive to a privileged constituency of interests and actors, in the U.S. consisting mainly
of government agencies, irrigation districts, and utilities. This system had and still has many
limitations, not the least of which are its limited jurisdiction, range of functions, and public
procedures.55 When the IBWC proved unable to tackle an emerging range of water quality
54
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problems, the La Paz Agreement came about as a binational response to these limitations.
Under this arrangement the two countries meet annually in formal session and more often in
informal workgroups to discuss binational environmental problems, including those that are
water related, and endeavor to find solutions or at least monitor developments to such a time that
more effective action is needed.56 The IBWC was acknowledged by the La Paz Agreement as
the lead agency for the two governments in transboundary water matters.57
While these arrangements successfully addressed some binational water problems they
were widely viewed in the border community as inadequate responses to a growing range of
water supply and water quality needs. When negotiations on the North American Free Trade
Agreement commenced, environmentalists and municipalities seized the opportunity to press the
governments to do more to protect the border environment. The governments responded in three
ways, first by beefing up the La Paz Agreement, second, by establishing institutional tandem of
the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank,
and third, by creating the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Each
of these developments added important institutional capacity for addressing binational water
disputes.
The process of strengthening the La Paz Agreement has been an ongoing effort,
beginning with the short-lived Integrated Border Environmental Plan, succeeded by the Border
XXI Program, and replaced in 2002 by the new Border 2012 Program.58 While space does not
permit a fuller discussion of the details of these successive binational programs they have in
common two important features that should be known. First, starting with the IBEP, the
governments through their respective environmental ministries adopted the language of
sustainable development as a rationale and a purpose of binational cooperation for environmental
protection. While this may be easily criticized as empty rhetoric, it is not. The language of
sustainable development, following its articulation at the international level at the Rio Summit
and elsewhere, is associated with a further commitment to procedural transparency, to
administrative decentralization, and public participation. It is also associated with a new
commitment to indicators and measurement, to integrative policy analysis, to the enforcement of
applicable rules and procedures and, in the case of water, to an embrace of watershed
management principles. None of this is stated explicitly in the La Paz Agreement. Second, the
governments committed additional resources to supporting the program, reflecting a modestly
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higher priority for these functions.59
This elaboration of the La Paz Agreement is directly associated with the modest level of
progress in binational groundwater management we have seen to date. Under the Border XXI
Program the two governments agreed, with the selective cooperation of the IBWC and other
federal and state agencies in both countries, to sponsor cooperative assessment of the Hueco and
Mesilla Bolsons in the El Paso-Cd. Juarez region and the Santa Cruz River aquifer at Nogales.
The first water quality assessment of the Mimbres aquifer at Columbus, New Mexico-Palomas,
Chihuahua was also funded.60 The La Paz initiatives have also been the catalyst for the creation
of citizen based watershed advisory bodies border wide. Under the new Border 2012 Program,
which is more decentralizing than its predecessor, new environmental task forces are being
formed in particular zones with a brief, among other priorities, to target solutions to local
watershed problems.61 These task forces are highly inclusive, incorporating municipalities, tribal
governments, and non-governmental organizations as members and are open to the public for a
broader base of public participation as they tackle water issues.62
The Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American
Development have added further capacity for addressing groundwater management at the
border.63 Established with NAFTA, the BECC-NADB duo were intended to support and
facilitate the development of new water projects in the border area to include potable water and
sanitation facilities and to do so in a manner that clearly advanced sustainable development in
impacted communities.64 In 2001 their operational mandate broadened to incorporate a wide
range of environmental projects, extending to water conservation and pollution prevention.65
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These new facilities effectively allow the BECC to support and fund any useful water
conservation or water quality project that would enhance groundwater protection and supply in
the border area. While BECC has mainly supported domestic projects on one side of the border
or the other, it has supported some binational water projects.66 There is no reason in principle
why it could not do so in support of a binational cooperative groundwater management program.
Its sustainable development project approval criteria are particularly congenial to any project
conceived and framed as advancing watershed management in the affected area.
Yet another institutional innovation is the Good Neighbor Environmental Board,
established by Congress in 1991. GNEB was created as presidential advisory board housed
within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency whose mandate is to advise the U.S.
government on important environmental concerns of the border community.67 GNEB is
comprised of government, private sector, and non-profit representatives from different regions of
the border area and conducts public hearings on environmental matters in preparation of its
annual report on the border environment. Though it a domestic and not a binational board its
reports have been highly sensitive to Mexico and cross-border issues and the need to move the
La Paz Agreement agenda forward. Since it published its first annual report in 1995 the GNEB
has twice focused on water resources as a lead theme, first in 2001 and again in 2004. In its
Fifth Report, GNEB explicitly endorsed a watershed management approach to border water
management and supported thinking of groundwater and surface water in an integrated,
conjunctive fashion.68 While its policy recommendations are non-binding and strictly advisory
it is fair to say that its views, by dent of its membership and degree of state and local
participation, articulate to federal and state government policy actors and help define needs and
set the agenda for further discussion and policy development. In this respect the GNEB’s
annual reports and policy recommendations represent a border-wide, consensus building
perspective. The fact that GNEB tends to be ahead of the state policy curve but sensitive to state
needs is an important aspect of legitimating reform initiatives.
The new institutions in binational water management and the focus on water through the
lens of sustainable development has influenced the functioning of the IBWC. In the 1990's,
acting on the recommendations of scholars, non-governmental advocacy groups, local
governments, and its experience as an ex-officio member of the BECC Board of Directors, the
66
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IBWC’s U.S. Section significantly beefed up its public relations and outreach capability.69
Under U.S. Commissioner John Bernal the U.S. Section took the initiative of developing its first
strategic plan. While that plan does not go as far the GNEB in endorsing a watershed
management approach–IBWC, after all, is constrained by the 1944 Treaty–it does align the
commission behind the principles of sustainable development and supports more public outreach
and public participation in the Section’s activities.70 The Mexican Section has yet to go so far
but it also considering a strategic planning approach that moves in this direction.71 It remains
unclear just how much state and federal support the IBWC enjoys in this process, but the effort
has certainly begun to alter the Commission’s long-time reputation for insularity and lack of
responsiveness to many local concerns.72
An important consequence of these reforms is the mobilization of a wider range of
participants and players in border water management. The border region has seen growth in
environmental advocacy organizations in the past decade and this is true of both nations.73 This
is supplemented for formal advisory bodies that are organized on a local or watershed basis.
The IBWC’s U.S. Section has established at least six such bodies since 1999 and these bodies
are found in most of the groundwater hot spots.74 The Border 2012 Program is now composing
site specific binational environmental task forces that tend to follow a watershed logic.75 What is
certain is the opportunities for public participation in watershed management in the border area
have never been better and a greater range of stakeholders are now routinely involved in state
and federal water policy discussions.
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These various changes in the context affecting binational cooperation on groundwater are
not insignificant opportunities for advancing binational cooperation on groundwater. While they
have not yet produced an actual agreement, they have drawn greater attention to the importance
of managing border groundwater resources more wisely and enhanced the legitimacy of those
arguing for binational management. They have improved the data base informing discussion at
all levels of government, and generated new resources that can be deployed in addressing
binational concerns. To put this in the theoretical language of common pool resources theory,76
what the past decade has witnessed is the development of greater transparency and available
knowledge of the resource, a growing basis of mutual understanding of the problem in the U.S.
and Mexico, and gradual, if ever so slight movement towards constitutional agreement on what
needs to be done and what should be done. It is this problem to which we now turn.

Taking the Next Step
In view of the enduring constraints on binational cooperation on transboundary aquifer
management it would be overly optimistic to predict the two countries would strike a formal
agreement any time soon of the sort contemplated in Minute 242. Property rights, subsidies and
markets still dominate the utilization of this resource and these variables still weigh against a
common, long-term, sustainable, and binational approach to groundwater management.
Even so, the context for considering binational management of this resource is certainly
changing. What we should expect to see in response are selective efforts at institutional
cooperation in particular transboundary aquifers where for one reason or another the basic
constraints are less compelling in the face of arguments for binational cooperation. It stands to
reason that we should expect a stronger incentive to cooperate where transboundary groundwater
is a primary, possibly the sole, water source for the community and where in the face of
development, drought, or other stressors, including pollution or the threat of pollution, it has
become more scarce or less reliable as supply, and where reliable information confirms that
trend, and where, in the absence of management, it may be exhausted, presenting a serious threat
to the welfare of communities in both countries. Furthermore, it stands to reason that
cooperation might be easier where there is some degree of coincidence in legal regimes
governing groundwater ownership and utilization in the adjacent communities. It is also
reasonable to suppose that where institutional history and convention have previously thwarted
cooperation it is wise to start with small steps that build trust and experience with cooperation
rather than moving aggressively to incorporate the highest level of institutional management at
the binational level. And it is important to have models or examples of how such cooperation
might be achieved.
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If we look carefully at the 17 or more groundwater basins straddling the border we can
see some communities that qualify on these measures.77 El Paso and Cd. Juarez certainly share
the element of scarcity and uncertainty, confronting declining groundwater tables, water
transfers, and escalating prices for urban water supply. Both communities depend heavily on
groundwater though both are now expanding their reliance on Rio Grande river water. The
nature and extent of the resource is now much better known owning to a landmark cooperative
study sponsored by the IBWC’s U.S. Section and state and municipal agencies and additional
research by non-profit and scholarly institutions under the aegis of the Border XXI Program and
the work of a relatively young public-private task force on regional water problems.78 Mexico’s
National Water Commission and Cd. Juarez’s Junta Municipal de Aguas have shared their water
development needs, plans, and some of the hydrological data with the United States. With urban
expansion the threat of contamination of the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons has increased and this is
a public concern. The prospect of a cooperative agreement on groundwater here has been
discussed for years but is taken more seriously by public officials in the last decade. The fact
the Mesilla Bolson also extends to New Mexico is a complication but New Mexico is the only
border state committed to safe yield management as a general rule of capture and could be
expected to consider ways to cooperate in any local initiative. The sister cities also share the
unique experience in North America of an operating binational cooperative arrangement for
managing their common airshed, a system formalized in Annex 5 to the La Paz Agreement and
conducted on a coordinate and semi-voluntary basis by both countries and financially supported
by the BECC and NADB.79 Though air and water are very different resources the experience
generated in this area may be useful in various aspects, at the very least in designing consultative
mechanisms for exchanging information.
The small communities of Columbus, New Mexico and Palomas, Chihuahua provide
another example of an area where cooperation may soon emerge.80 These communities share a
common aquifer, the Mimbres river. Both have developed rapidly in the past decade as
agricultural commerce, maquiladora expansion, retirement housing, even immigration policies
have driven demographic growth. Owing to upstream pumping the Mimbres long ago ran dry
77
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and today the towns are wholly dependent on groundwater for municipal supply.81 Aquifer
contamination is a serious threat.82 More is known of the aquifer in terms of supply and
contamination owing to recent social and hydrological studies funded by the Border XXI
Program83. The two communities have a long history of cooperating on practical matters. New
Mexico’s approach to groundwater management comes closest of an border state to Mexican
practice. And, importantly, this is one of the closed basins on the border not hydrologically
linked to the Rio Grande or Colorado rivers.84
Or we might look at the twin cities of Nogales on the Arizona-Sonora border. Both cities
are hydrologically linked by the Santa Cruz river aquifer, an aquifer that feeds to the Gila River
which, in turn, drains to the Colorado River.85 Both are experiencing rapid urbanization and
rising water demand due to the growth of the maquiladora industry and agricultural commerce.
Both depend a hundred percent for municipal supply on groundwater86–an initiative to run
Central Arizona Project water to Nogales, Arizona remains stalled.87 There is a significant
threat of groundwater contamination in the aquifer.88 Both have a long history of cooperation in
water sanitation matters as Nogales was one of the original international wastewater treatment
plants developed on the border by IBWC.89 On the Arizona side, the aquifer is already
designated an Active Management Area under the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Act.90 In short,
many of the conditions favoring cooperation are already present in this area.
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To be sure, there are other aquifers where cooperation is not so likely to prevail. The
long-term dispute over lining the All-American Canal in the Imperial Valley is one of those
cases where the stakes are high, 1944 Water Treaty questions are outstanding, the controversy
remains highly visible and provocative, national sovereignty has been invoked, and regional
water dynamics appear to work against binational cooperation.91 In the face of Mexican
arguments to the contrary, the U.S. claims there is no hydrological connection between seepage
from the treaty water channeled through the canal and the state of the Colorado River aquifer as
it drains into Mexico, that U.S. surface water is rightfully severable from the groundwater
system, and that the U.S. has no obligation beyond friendship and comity to mitigate any damage
to Mexico caused by the loss of seepage from the AAC.92 Mexico, in turn, argues that the
baseline groundwater conditions were never established before the canal was constructed, that
groundwater was never formally divided (an indisputable claim) between the two countries, that
the AAC may affect the hydrology and this should be carefully studied before drawing
conclusions, that U.S. actions in the salinity crisis made Mexico more dependent on
groundwater, that the U.S. failed to secure its seepage for more than half a century thus
potentially relinquishing some of its right under the doctrine of equitable utilization international
law, and that the U.S. is acting unilaterally to force a solution instead of proceeding in a more
cooperative manner.93 The two sides are now quite polarized on the issue and it is difficult to
see this dispute being settled cooperatively.
As we consider the prospect for cooperation in transboundary groundwater management
we should further consider that cooperation is more likely to emerge at the low end of the ladder
of institutional complexity. In localities like Columbus-Palomas the possibility exists for
informal cooperation between municipal water authorities for sustainable yield or greater
conservation, or simply pollution prevention depending on local priorities, based on regular
exchange of information and collaborative planning exercises resulting in coordinate
management where decisions are non-binding but generally supported by a full range of
stakeholders on both sides of the border. Such informal arrangements are certainly problematic
where large appropriators in the aquifer are free to defect from the pact or refuse to engage in the
91
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management dialogue. Local planning decisions need to be compatible with existing and
applicable domestic law and practice. Ideally, other levels of government should cooperate at
least through a memorandum of understanding with local agency taking initiative. But it may be
easier to move up the scale to more formal arrangements after informal cooperation has been
initiated. The current move towards binational exchange of groundwater data certainly moves
in this direction.
In conclusion, while the odds against an agreement on transboundary groundwater at the
U.S-Mexico border remain high, there is reason to suppose that some form of systematic
cooperation will emerge at various locations along the international boundary within this decade.
The needs are there and the social and institutional circumstances are now more favorable for the
emergence of cooperation in various locations along the border. The institutional scale of
cooperation may be modest and the management aims more limited. But these initiatives should
be supported by state and federal governments one both sides of the border. As they are
successful it may be feasible to go to the next level and formalize these arrangements through La
Paz annexes and IBWC minutes, or even consider developing a binational insititutional
mechanism that has at least some of the capabilities that professors Robert Hayton and Al Utton
outlined in the Bellagio Draft Treaty on Transboundary Groundwater more than a decade ago.94
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• Greater attention to protecting groundwater stock

• Changing Institutional Context
•
•
•
•
•

Strengthening the La Paz Agreement
Border Environment Cooperation Commission
Good Neighbor
g
Environmental Board
IBWC/CILA changes
Summary—Common Pool Resources Theory:
» Greater knowledge and transparency
» Growing mutuality (values, sense of threats and benefits)
» Changing constitutionality (notion of what should be done)

BINATIONAL GNDWATER
COOPERATION: Next Steps
• Cooperation likely to emerge where:
• Groundwater sole source of supply for binational community.
• Scarcity looms-backed by reliable data that are credible in both
countries.
• Coincidence or greater approximation of legal and
administrative systems.
• Where local, informal, and modest practical measures are
reciprocally taken to conserve the total water supply.
• Where institutional models are available.

Three Cases of
EMERGING COOPERATION
Localities//
Criteria

El Paso-Cd.
Juarez

ColumbusPalomas

Ambos Nogales

Water source/
Basin type

80% groundwtr
Linked basin

100% groundwtr
Closed basin

100% groundwtr
Linked basin

Looming scarcity

Exhaustion by 2025; Significant
contamination
overdraft; high
threats
fluoride
concentrations

US Aquifer
stabilized; Mexico
declining &
wastewater
reclamation
threat to US

Legal aspect

Sharp contrast

Some similarities

Some similarities

Informal
consultation/
NGO involvement

Binational quality
studies; AMA data
NGO involvement

Local steps & Models Data sharing;
consultation
Air qquality
y
model/NGO
involvement

